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Abstract
This paper studies active learning in the context of robust statistics. Specifically,
we propose a variant of the Best Arm Identification problem for contaminated ban-
dits, where each arm pull has probability ε of generating a sample from an arbitrary
contamination distribution instead of the true underlying distribution. The goal is
to identify the best (or approximately best) true distribution with high probability,
with a secondary goal of providing guarantees on the quality of this distribution. The
primary challenge of the contaminated bandit setting is that the true distributions
are only partially identifiable, even with infinite samples. To address this, we develop
tight, non-asymptotic sample complexity bounds for high-probability estimation of
the first two robust moments (median and median absolute deviation) from contami-
nated samples. These concentration inequalities are the main technical contributions
of the paper and may be of independent interest. Using these results, we adapt sev-
eral classical Best Arm Identification algorithms to the contaminated bandit setting
and derive sample complexity upper bounds for our problem. Finally, we provide
matching information-theoretic lower bounds on the sample complexity (up to a small
logarithmic factor).
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1 Introduction
Consider Pat, an aspiring machine learning researcher deciding between working in a
statistics, mathematics, or computer science department. Pat’s sole criterion is salary,
so Pat surveys current academics with the goal of finding the department with highest
median income. However, some subset of the data will be inaccurate: some respondents
obscure their salaries for privacy, some convert currency incorrectly, and some do not read
the question and report yearly instead of monthly salary, etc. How should Pat target his
or her surveys, in an adaptive (online) fashion, to find the highest paying department with
high probability in the presence of contaminated data?
In this paper, we study the Best Arm Identification (BAI) problem for multi-armed
bandits where observed rewards are not completely trustworthy. The multi-armed ban-
dit problem has received extensive study in the last three decades [Lai and Robbins,
1985, Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012]. We study the fixed confidence, or (α, δ)-PAC,
BAI problem, in which the learner must identify an α-suboptimal arm with probability at
least 1−δ, using as few samples as possible. Most BAI algorithms for the fixed-confidence
setting assume i.i.d. rewards from distributions with relatively strict control on the tails,
such as boundedness or more generally sub-Gaussianity [Jamieson et al., 2014]. However,
for Pat, the data are neither i.i.d. nor from a distribution with controllable tails. How
can we model this data, and how can we optimally explore these arms?
To answer the first question, we turn to robust statistics, which has studied such ques-
tions for over fifty years. In a seminal paper, Huber [1964] introduced the contamination
model, which we adapt to the multi-armed bandit model by proposing the Contaminated
Best Arm Identification problem (CBAI). This is formally defined in Section 2, but is
informally described as follows. There are k ≥ 2 arms, each endowed with a fixed base
distribution Fi and arbitrary contamination distributions Gi,t for t ≥ 1. We place abso-
lutely no assumptions on Gi,t. When arm i is pulled in round t, the learner receives a
sample that with probability 1− ε is drawn from the arm’s true distribution Fi, and with
the remaining probability ε is drawn from an arbitrary contamination distribution Gi,t.
The goal is to identify the arm whose true distribution has the highest (or approximately
highest) median. The median is the goal rather than the mean since the distributions
are not assumed to have finite first moments; and even if they do, the true distributions’
means are impossible to estimate from contaminated samples since the contaminations
may be arbitrary. A key point is that suboptimality of the arms is based on the quality
of the underlying true distributions Fi, not the contaminated distributions F˜i,t of the ob-
served samples. Note that existing BAI algorithms, fed with samples from F˜i,t, will not
necessarily work.
This contamination model nicely fits Pat’s problem: samples are usually trustworthy,
but sometimes they are completely off and cannot be modeled by a distribution with
controlled tails. Additionally, the nature of contamination changes with the respondent,
and hence Gi,t should be considered as time varying, which completely breaks the usual
i.i.d. data assumption. Finally, Pat wants to determine the department with highest true
median salary, not highest contaminated median (or mean) salary.
The contaminated bandit setup also naturally models many other situations that the
classical bandit setup cannot, such as any bandit problem where data may be subject to
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measurement or recording error with some probability. For example, consider the canonical
problem of optimal experiment design where we are measuring drug responses, but in a
setting where samples can be corrupted or where test results can be incorrectly measured
or recorded. Another example is testing new software features, where yet-unfixed bugs
may distort responses but will be fixed before release. More scenarios are discussed in
Subsection 1.2 when comparing to other models in previous works, and in Subsection 2.1
after the formal definition of the CBAI problem.
Importantly, the CBAI problem is nontrivially harder than the BAI problem since
there are no consistent estimators for statistics (including the mean or median) of Fi if the
contaminations are allowed to be arbitrary. Under some mild technical assumptions on Fi,
the contamination can cause the median of F˜i,t to be anywhere in an Θ(ε)-neighborhood
of the median of Fi, and hence we can only determine the median of Fi up to some
unavoidable estimation bias, Ui, of order ε (see Section 2 for details). This leads us to
generalize our study to the more abstract Partially Identifiable Best Arm Identification
(PIBAI) problem (defined formally in Section 3), which includes CBAI as a special case.
This PIBAI problem can be seen as an active-learning version of the classical problem
of estimation under partial identifiability, which has been studied for most of the last
century in the econometrics literature [Marschak and Andrews, 1944, Manski, 2009]. A
canonical problem in this field is trying to learn the age distribution of a population by
only asking in which decade each subject was born; clearly the median age can only be
learned up to certain unidentifiability regions.
1.1 Our Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to consider the Best Arm Identification
problem with arbitrary contaminations. This contaminated bandit setup models many
practical problems that the classical bandit setup cannot. However, developing algorithms
for this setup requires overcoming the challenge of partial identifiability of the arms’ true
distributions. Indeed, it is not hard to show that the adversary’s ability to inject arbitrary
contaminations can render “similar” underlying distributions indistinguishable, even with
access to infinite samples.
We analyze this CBAI problem under three models of the adversary’s power: the
oblivious adversary chooses all contamination distributions a priori; the prescient adver-
sary may choose the contamination distributions as a function of all realizations (past and
future) of the true rewards and knowledge of when the learner will observe contaminated
samples; and the malicious adversary may, in addition, correlate when the learner observes
contaminated samples with the true rewards. Subsection 2.1 gives formal definitions of
these adversarial settings, as well as motivating examples and applications for each.
Our technical contributions can be divided into three parts:
(i) we prove tight, non-asymptotic sample complexity bounds for estimation of the first
two robust moments (median and median absolute deviation) from contaminated
samples,
(ii) we use the statistical results in (i) to develop efficient algorithms for theCBAI problem
and provide sample complexity upper bounds for the fixed-confidence setting, and
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(iii) we prove matching information-theoretic lower bounds showing that our algorithms
have optimal sample complexity (up to small logarithmic factors).
We elaborate on each of these below.
Contribution (i). These concentration inequalities are the main technical contribu-
tions of the paper and may be of independent interest to the robust statistics community.
We consider estimating statistics of a single arm from contaminated samples and show
that although estimation of standard moments (mean, variance) is impossible, estimation
of robust moments (median, median absolute deviation) is possible. Specifically, for each
of the three adversarial models, we show that with probability at least 1− δ, the empirical
median of the contaminated samples lies in a region around the true median of width
Ui + En,δ, where Ui is some unavoidable bias that depends on quantiles of Fi and the
power of the adversary, n is the number of samples, and En,δ is a confidence-interval term
that decreases at the optimal
√
log 1/δ
n rate. Our results neatly capture the effect of the
adversary’s power by deriving different Ui for each scenario, thereby precisely quantifying
the hardness of the three different adversarial settings. We also present non-asymptotic
sample complexity guarantees for estimation of the second robust moment, often called
the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD), under all three adversarial settings. The MAD is
a robust measure of the spread of Fi and controls the width Ui of the median’s unidentifi-
ability region.
Contribution (ii). We show that, surprisingly, several classical BAI algorithms are
readily adaptable to the PIBAI problem. This suggests a certain inherent robustness
of these classical bandit algorithms. We first present these algorithms for an abstract
version of the PIBAI problem so that our algorithmic results may be easily transferrable
to other application domains with different statistics of interest or different contamination
models. We then combine these general results with our statistical results from (i) to obtain
PAC algorithms for CBAI, the problem this paper focuses on. We give fixed-confidence
sample complexity guarantees that mirror the sample complexity guarantees for BAI in
the classical stochastic multi-armed bandit setup. The main difference is that BAI sample
complexities depend on the suboptimality “gaps” ∆i := pi∗ − pi between the statistics of
the optimal arm i∗ and each suboptimal arm i, whereas our CBAI sample complexities
depend on the suboptimality “effective gaps” ∆˜i := (pi∗−Ui∗)−(pi+Ui) = ∆i−(Ui∗+Ui),
which account for the unavoidable estimation uncertainties in the most pessimistic way.
We also show how to apply the MAD estimations results from (i) to obtain guarantees on
the quality of the underlying distribution of the selected arm.
Contribution (iii). We prove matching information-theoretic lower bounds (up to a
small logarithmic factor) on the sample complexity of CBAI via a reduction to classical
lower bounds for the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem. We argue that for CBAI the
effective gap ∆˜i is the right analog of the traditional gap since it appears in matching ways
in both our upper and lower bounds.
1.2 Previous Work
The Best Arm Identification problem in the fixed-confidence setting has a long history,
starting from work by Bechhofer et al. [1968] and Lai and Robbins [1985]. Recent interest
5
from the learning theory community was sparked by the seminal paper by Even-Dar et al.
[2002], which proposed several algorithms obtaining instance-adaptive sample complexity
bounds. Since then, there has been significant work on the algorithmic side [see work by
Kalyanakrishnan et al., 2012, Gabillon et al., 2012, Karnin et al., 2013, Jamieson et al.,
2013, 2014]. Concurrently, a parallel line of work has focused on improving lower bounds,
starting with the 2-armed setting [Chernoff, 1972, Anthony and Bartlett, 2009], extending
to the multi-armed setting [Mannor and Tsitsiklis, 2004], and, more recently, continuing
with more finely tuned lower bounds that include properties of the arm distributions aside
from the gaps [Chen and Li, 2015, Kaufmann et al., 2016, Garivier and Kaufmann, 2016].
In the cumulative regret setting, the online learning literature has considered both
stochastic bandits with mild tail assumptions (for example, Bubeck et al. [2013] only as-
sumed the existence of a (1 + ε) moment) and algorithms that obtain near-optimal regret
guarantees if the environment is stochastic or adversarial [Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012].
The partial monitoring problem, where the learner only knows the loss up to some sub-
set [Barto´k et al., 2014], is also loosely similar to the CBAI problem in the sense that
both problems feature partial identification. We note, however, that minimizing cumula-
tive regret is not a reasonable goal in our contamination setup since the contaminations
can be arbitrary and even unbounded. (Furthermore, even when boundedness is assumed,
minimizing cumulative regret can still be a poor criteria; see below for concrete examples.)
The existing literature closest to our work studies the BAI problem in settings more
general than i.i.d. arms, for example stochastic but non-stationary distributions [Allesiardo et al.,
2017, Allesiardo and Fe´raud, 2017] or arbitrary rewards where each arm converges to a
limit [Jamieson and Talwalkar, 2016, Li et al., 2016]. However, neither setting fits the
contamination model or allows for arbitrary perturbations.
A related contamination model is studied by Seldin and Slivkins [2014]; however, they
make a boundedness assumption which makes their setup drastically different from ours.1
Specifically, they consider cumulative regret minimization in a setting where rewards are
bounded in [0, 1] and contaminations can be arbitrary. Because of this [0, 1] boundedness,
contamination can move the means by at most ε, which is why it is reasonable that they
base their algorithms on the contaminated means. However, the best contaminated mean
is not a reasonable proxy for the best mean without the [0, 1] boundedness assumption.
First off, the contaminated distributions may not even have finite first moments. Moreover,
when rewards are bounded but only within a large range, the contaminated mean can
deviate from the true mean by ε times the size of that range. This can lead to an error
bound that is extremely loose – sometimes to the point of being useless for prediction or
estimation – compared to the tight bound given by quantiles (see Lemma 1) which our
algorithms achieve (see Subsection 4.2).
For instance, consider the adaptive survey example mentioned earlier. There might be
a wide range of (true) academic salaries, say between zero and a million dollars. As such,
contaminating an ε fraction of the data could move the mean by roughly 106 ·ε; even for a
reasonable value of ε = 0.1, this error bound of roughly 105 is so large that it may drown
out the actual information that the survey was trying to investigate. On the other hand,
1Another difference is that our setup and results also work for more powerful types of contaminating
adversaries.
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the median may be moved a significantly smaller amount since the (true) distribution of
academic salaries might have reasonably narrow quantiles around the median (for example,
being somewhat bell-shaped is sufficient). This performance improvement is intuitively
explained by the fact that most academic salaries are not at the extremes of 0 or a million
dollars, but rather are fairly regular around the median. An identical phenomenon occurs
in the canonical problem of optimal experiment design where we are measuring drug
responses but samples can be corrupted or where test results can be incorrectly measured
or recorded. Indeed, if the measurements of interests are, say, blood pressure or weight,
the values might only be bounded within a large range, but the true distribution might
have reasonably narrow quantiles around the median.
We note that the need for robust bandit algorithms is further motivated by the recent
work of Jun et al. [2018], which shows that in a similar model, an adversary can make
certain classical bandit algorithms perform very poorly by injecting only a small amount
of contamination into the observed samples.
This paper also makes connections between several long bodies of work. The contami-
nation model [Huber, 1964] has a long history of more than fifty years in robust statistics;
for examples, see work by Hampel [1974], Maronna and Yohai [1976], Rousseeuw and Leroy
[2005], Hampel et al. [2011]. Contamination models and malicious errors also have a long
history in computer science, including the classical work of Valiant [1985], Kearns and Li
[1993] and a recent burst of results on algorithms that handle estimation of means and
variances [Lai et al., 2016], efficient estimation in high dimensions [Diakonikolas et al.,
2018], PCA [Cherapanamjeri et al., 2017], and general learning [Charikar et al., 2017] in
the presence of outliers or corrupted data. Finally, the partial identification literature from
econometrics also has a rich history [Marschak and Andrews, 1944, Horowitz and Manski,
1995, Manski, 2009, Romano and Shaikh, 2010, Bontemps et al., 2012].
1.3 Notation
We denote the Dirac measure at a point x ∈ R by δx, the Bernoulli distribution with
parameter p ∈ [0, 1] by Ber(p), and the uniform distribution over an interval [a, b] by
Unif([a, b]). The interval [a − b, a + b] is denoted by [a±b], the set of non-negative real
numbers by R≥0, the set of positive integers by N, and the set {1, . . . , n} by [n] for n ∈ N.
We abbreviate “with high probability” by “w.h.p.” and “cumulative distribution function”
by “cdf”.
Let F be a cdf. We denote its left and right quantiles, respectively, by QL,F (p) :=
inf{x ∈ R : F (x) ≥ p} and QR,F (p) := inf{x ∈ R : F (x) > p}; the need for this technical
distinction arises when F is not strictly increasing. We denote the set of medians of F
by m1(F ) := [QL,F (
1
2 ), QR,F (
1
2 )]. When F has a unique median, we overload m1(F ) to
be this point rather than a singleton set containing it. For shorthand, we often write
m1(X) for a random variable X to denote m1(F ), where F is the law of X. When F
has a unique median, we denote the median absolute deviation (MAD) of F by m2(F ) :=
m1(|X −m1(F )|) where X ∼ F . When m2(F ) is unique, we define m4(F ) := m1(||X −
m1(F )|−m2(F )|). Note that m1(F ), m2(F ), and m4(F ) are robust analogues of centered
first (mean), second (variance), and fourth (kurtosis) moments, respectively.
The empirical median of a (possibly random) sequence x1, . . . , xn ∈ R is denoted by
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mˆ1(x1, . . . , xn): if n is odd, this is the middle value; and if n is even, it is the average of
the middle two values. The empirical MAD mˆ2(x1, . . . , xn) is then defined as mˆ1(|x1 −
mˆ1(x1, . . . , xn)|, . . . , |xn − mˆ1(x1, . . . , xn)|).
1.4 Outline
Section 2 formally defines the CBAI problem and the power of the adversary, describes
several motivating applications and examples, and discusses the primary challenge of the
problem: partial identifiability. Section 3 presents our algorithmic results for the abstract
setting of best arm identification under partial identifiability (the PIBAI problem). We
state these algorithms in this general setting so that they may be easily transferrable later
to other application domains with different statistics of interest or different contamination
models. Section 4 then specializes to the CBAI problem. In order to implement the afore-
mentioned general-purpose PIBAI algorithms for CBAI, concentration results are needed
for estimation of medians given contaminated samples. These statistical results are devel-
oped in Subsection 4.1, and then used to derive upper bounds on the sample complexity
of our CBAI algorithms in Subsection 4.2. Subsection 4.3 gives matching information-
theoretic lower bounds on the sample complexity, showing that our algorithms are optimal
(up to small logarithmic factors). This answers the primary question the paper sets out
to solve: understanding the complexity of identifying the arm with best median given
contaminated samples. Section 5 then turns to our secondary goal: providing guarantees
on the distribution of the selected arm. This goal requires additionally estimating the
second robust moment. Subsection 5.1 develops the necessary statistical results, which
are then used in Subsection 5.2 provide our algorithmic results. Section 6 concludes and
discusses several open problems.
2 Formal Setup
Here we formally define the Contaminated Best Arm Identification problem (CBAI). Let
k ≥ 2 be the number of arms, ε ∈ (0, 12) be the contamination level, {Fi}i∈[k] be the true
but unknown distributions, and {Gi,t}i∈[k],t∈N be arbitrary contamination distributions.
This induces contaminated distributions F˜i,t, samples from which are equal in distribution
to (1 − Di,t)Yi,t + Di,tZi,t, where Di,t ∼ Ber(ε), Yi,t ∼ Fi, and Zi,t ∼ Gi,t. Note that
if all of these random variables are independent, then each F˜i,t is simply equal to the
contaminated mixture model (1− ε)Fi+ εGi,t. However, we generalize by also considering
the setting when the Yi,t,Di,t, Zi,t are not all independent, which allows an adversary to
further obfuscate samples by adapting the distributions of the Di,t and Zi,t based on the
realizations of the Yi,t (that is, by coupling these random variables); see below for details.
At each iteration t, a CBAI algorithm chooses an arm It ∈ [k] to pull and receives a
sample XIt,t distributed according to the corresponding contaminated distribution F˜It,t.
After T iterations (a possibly random stopping time that the algorithm may choose), the
algorithm outputs an arm Iˆ ∈ [k]. For α ≥ 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), the algorithm is said to be
(α, δ)-PAC if, with probability at least 1 − δ, Iˆ has median within α + U of the optimal;
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that is,
P
(
m1(FIˆ) ≥ maxi∈[k] m1(Fi)− (α+ U)
)
≥ 1− δ, (1)
where U is the unavoidable uncertainty term in median estimation that is induced by
partial identifiability (see Subsection 2.2 for a discussion of U , and see Subsection 4.1 for
an explicit computation of this quantity). Thus, the goal is to find an algorithm achieving
the PAC guarantee in (1) with small expected sample complexity T .
2.1 Power of the Adversary
As is typical in online learning problems, it is important to define the power of the adver-
sary since this affects the complexity of the resulting problem. Interestingly, CBAI is still
possible even when we grant the adversary significant power. We consider three settings,
presented in increasing order of adversarial power. The key differences between these
different types of adversaries are twofold: (1) whether they can choose the contaminated
distributions “presciently” based on all other realizations {Yi,t,Di,t}i∈[k],t≥1 both past and
future; and (2) whether they can “maliciously” couple the distributions of each Di,t with
the corresponding Yi,t, subject only to the constraint that the marginals Di,t ∼ Ber(ε) and
Yi,t ∼ Fi stay correct.
• Oblivious adversary. For all i ∈ [k], the triples {(Yi,t,Di,t, Zi,t)}t≥1 are indepen-
dent, and for all t ≥ 1, Yi,t ∼ Fi, Di,t ∼ Ber(ε), and Yi,t and Di,t are independent.
• Prescient adversary. Same as the oblivious adversary except that the contam-
inations Zi,t may depend on everything else (i.e. {Yj,s,Dj,s, Zj,s}j∈[k],s≥1). For-
mally, for all i ∈ [k], the pairs {(Yi,t,Di,t)}t≥1 are independent, and for all t ≥ 1,
Yi,t ∼ Fi, Di,t ∼ Ber(ε), Yi,t and Di,t are independent, and Zi,t may depend on all
{Yj,s,Dj,s, Zj,s}j∈[k],s≥1.
• Malicious adversary. Same as the prescient adversary except that Yi,t and Di,t
do not need to be independent. Formally, for all i ∈ [k], the pairs {(Yi,t,Di,t)}t≥1
are independent, and for all t ≥ 1, Yi,t ∼ Fi, Di,t ∼ Ber(ε), and Zi,t may depend on
all {Yj,s,Dj,s, Zj,s}j∈[k],s≥1.
We note that for all three of these adversarial settings, we do not require independence
between the outputs (Yi,t,Di,t, Zi,t) across the arms for each fixed t.
The oblivious adversary is well-motivated, as many real-world problems where con-
taminations may occur fit naturally into this model. Indeed, this setting encompasses any
bandit problem where data may be subject to measurement or recording error with some
probability, such as measuring drug responses for clinical trials [Lai and Robbins, 1985],
conducting surveys [Martin and Miron, 1992], or testing new software features with yet-
unfixed bugs as mentioned in the introduction. The theory we develop extends naturally
and with little modification for the prescient and malicious adversaries. Moreover, these
different settings allow for the modeling of many other real-world scenarios in which the
contamination models are not as simple. For instance, all data may already exist but not
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yet be released to the learning algorithm. If adversaries have access to all the data from
the beginning, they may be able to contaminate samples depending on all the data – this
is captured by the prescient setting. The malicious setting includes, for example, scenarios
in which adversaries (for example, hackers) can successfully contaminate a given sample
depending on the amount of effort they put into it, and the adversaries can try harder to
contaminate certain samples depending on their values.
Perhaps surprisingly, we will show that the sample complexity is the same for both
oblivious and prescient adversaries. Indeed for these two settings, we will prove our upper
bounds for the more powerful setting of prescient adversaries, and our lower bounds for
the less powerful setting of oblivious adversaries. We also note that the rate for malicious
adversaries is only worse by at most a “factor of 2”; see Section 4 for a precise statement.
2.2 The Challenge of Partial Identifiability of the Median
In the introduction, we emphasized the point that a contaminating adversary can render
different underlying distributions of an arm statistically indistinguishable. That is, even
with infinite samples, it is impossible to estimate statistics of an arm’s true distribution
exactly. Consider, for example, the problem of estimating the median of a single arm
with true distribution F against an oblivious adversary, which is the weakest of our three
adversarial settings. Define S to be the set of all distributions F ′ for which there exists
adversarially chosen distributions G and G′ such that (1 − ε)F + εG = (1 − ε)F ′ + εG′.
How large is this set S, and in particular, how far can the medians of distributions in S
be from the median of F?
The following simple example shows that S is non-trivial (and thus in particular con-
tains more than just F ). Let F be the uniform distribution on the interval [−1, 1], and
let G be the uniform distribution on [−1 − c,−1] ∪ [1, 1 + c], where c = ε(1 − ε)−1. The
contaminated distribution F˜ := (1−ε)F +εG is the uniform distribution on [−1−c, 1+c].
However, for any p ∈ [−c, c], F˜ is also equal to (1 − ε)F (· − p) + εGp, where Gp is the
uniform distribution over [−1−c, 1+c]\ [−1+p, 1+p]. We conclude that F is statistically
indistinguishable from any of the translations {F (· − p)}p∈[−c,c]. Hence, S is non-trivial
and contains distributions with medians at least Ω(c) away from m1(F ). Even in this
simple setting, infinite samples only allow us to identify the median of F at most up to
the unidentifiability region [−c, c].
In fact, this toy example captures the correct dependence on ε of how far the median
of the contaminated distribution can be shifted, as formalized by the following simple
lemma.
Lemma 1. For any ε ∈ (0, 12), any distribution F , and any median m ∈ m1(F ),
sup
distribution G,
m˜∈m1((1−ε)F+εG)
|m˜−m| = max
{
QR,F
(
1
2(1 − ε)
)
−m,m−QL,F
(
1− 2ε
2(1− ε)
)}
.
Proof. The fact that the left hand side is no smaller than the right hand side is straight-
forward: to shift the median to the right (resp. left), let {Gn}n∈N be a sequence of
distributions which are Dirac measures at n (resp. −n).
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We now prove the reverse direction, the “≤” inequality for any fixed distribution
G. For shorthand, denote the contaminated distribution by F˜ := (1 − ε)F + εG, and
denote its left and right medians by m˜L := QL,F˜ (
1
2) and m˜R := QR,F˜ (
1
2), respectively.
Since every median of F˜ lies within [m˜L, m˜R], it suffices to show that m˜L ≥ QL,F ( 1−2ε2(1−ε))
and m˜R ≤ QR,F ( 12(1−ε)). We bound m˜L presently, as bounding m˜R follows by a similar
argument or by simply applying the m˜L bound to F (−·). By definition of m˜L, for all t > 0,
1
2 ≤ F˜ (m˜L+t) = (1−ε)F (m˜L+t)+εG(m˜L+t) ≤ (1−ε)F (m˜L+t)+ε, where the last step
is because G(m˜L+ t) ≤ 1 since G is a distribution. Rearranging yields F (m˜L+ t) ≥ 1−2ε2(1−ε) ,
which implies that m˜L ≥ QL,F ( 1−2ε2(1−ε)).
Finally, we note that for some simple contamination models, partial identifiability in
CBAI is not a problem for identifying the arm with the best median. For example, if all
arms are contaminated with a common distribution, then although the true medians are
only partially identifiable, the contaminated medians are ordered in the same way as the
true medians, albeit perhaps not strictly. However, for general (arbitrary) contaminations,
such an ordering invariance is clearly not guaranteed.
3 Algorithms for Best Arm Identification Under Partial
Identifiability
Our algorithms for CBAI actually work for the more general problem of best arm identifi-
cation in partially identified settings. Specifically, consider any setting where the statistic
(for example, the median or mean) which measures the goodness of an arm can be esti-
mated only up to some unavoidable error term due to lack of identifiability. The main
result of this section is informally that certain BAI algorithms for the classical stochas-
tic multi-armed bandit setting can be adapted with little modification to such partially
identified settings. Perhaps surprisingly, this suggests a certain innate robustness of these
existing classical BAI algorithms.
We present our algorithms in this section for this slightly more abstract problem of
Partially Identifiable Best-Arm-Identification problem (PIBAI), which we define formally
below. This abstraction allows our algorithmic results to later be transferred easily to
other variants of the Best Arm Identification problem with different contamination models
or different statistics of interest. We will show in Section 4 how to adapt this to the
CBAI problem, the main focus of the paper, after first developing the necessary statistical
results.
We now formally define the setup of PIBAI. Let k ≥ 2 be the number of arms. For
each arm i ∈ [k], consider a family of distributions Di = {Di(pi, G)}G∈G where pi is
a real-valued measure of the quality of arm i and G is a nuisance parameter in some
abstract space G. We let i∗ := argmaxi∈[k] pi be the best arm. We assume the existence
of non-negative unavoidable biases {Ui}i∈[k] satisfying
(i) even from infinitely many independent samples Xt, t = 1, 2, . . . with Xt ∼ Di(pi, Gt)
for some unknown, possibly varying Gt ∈ G (t ≥ 1), it is impossible to estimate pi
more precisely than the region [pi ±Ui], and
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for i ∈ [k] do
Sample arm i for nα/2,δ/k times and produce estimate pˆi
end
Output Iˆ := maxi∈[k] pˆi.
Algorithm 1: Simple uniform exploration algorithm for PIBAI.
(ii) there exists some estimator that, for any α > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), uses nα,δ =
O(α−2 log 1δ ) i.i.d. samples
2 from Di to output an estimate pˆi satisfying
P
(
pˆi ∈ [pi ± (Ui + α)]
)
≥ 1− δ. (2)
The PIBAI problem is then precisely the standard fixed-confidence stochastic bandit prob-
lem using these distributions where in each iteration t, the algorithm chooses an arm
It ∈ [k] and receives a sample from DIt(pIt, Gt) for some unknown Gt ∈ G.
By the partial identifiability property (i), it is clear that even given infinite samples,
it is impossible to distinguish between the optimal arm i∗ and any suboptimal arm i 6= i∗
satisfying pi + Ui ≥ pi∗ − Ui∗ . Therefore, we assume henceforth the statistically possible
setting in which the effective gaps ∆˜i := (pi∗ − Ui∗) − (pi + Ui) are strictly positive for
each suboptimal arm i 6= i∗.
For any α ≥ 0, arm i is said to be α-suboptimal if ∆˜i ≤ α. Moreover, for any α ≥ 0
and δ ∈ (0, 1), a PIBAI algorithm is said to be (α, δ)-PAC if it outputs an arm Iˆ that is
α-suboptimal with probability at least 1− δ. That is,
P
(
∆˜Iˆ ≤ α
) ≥ 1− δ,
where the above probability is taken over the possible randomness of the samples, the
estimator from (ii), and the PIBAI algorithm.
We now present algorithms for the PIBAI problem. First, in Subsection 3.1, we present
a simple algorithm that performs uniform exploration among all arms. Next, in Subsec-
tion 3.2, we obtain more refined, instance-adaptive sample complexity bounds by adapting
the Successive Elimination algorithm of [Even-Dar et al., 2006]. All algorithms use as
a blackbox an estimator satisfying the above property (ii) of the PIBAI problem.
3.1 Simple Algorithm
A simple (α, δ)-PAC PIBAI algorithm is the following: pull each of the k arms nα/2,δ/k
times to create estimates pˆi and output the arm Iˆ := maxi∈[k] pˆi with the highest estimate.
Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1.
2Using the same techniques as presented in this paper, one can also consider PIBAI for general nα,δ 6=
O(α−2 log 1
δ
) and compute the resulting sample complexities. However, for simplicity of presentation,
we assume that nα,δ = O(α
−2 log 1
δ
) since anyways this is the natural (and optimal) quantity for many
estimation problems such as estimating a median from contaminated samples (see Corollaries 12 and 13),
or using Chernoff bounds to estimate the mean of a [0, 1]-supported distribution for classical stochastic
MAB, etc.
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S ← [k], r ← 1
while |S| > 1 do
Sample each arm i ∈ S once and produce pˆi,r from all r past samples of it
S ← {i ∈ S : pˆi,r ≥ maxj∈S pˆj,r − 2αr,6δ/(pi2kr2)}
r ← r + 1
end
Output the only arm left in S
Algorithm 2: Adaptation of Successive Elimination algorithm for PIBAI. Here,
αr,δ :=
√
c log
1
δ
r , where c is a universal constant satisfying nα,δ ≤ cα−2 log 1δ (see
Equation 2).
Theorem 2. For any α > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), Algorithm 1 is an (α, δ)-PAC PIBAI algorithm
with sample complexity O(knα/2,δ/k) = O
(
k
α2
log kδ
)
.
Proof. By (2) and a union bound, we have that with probability at least 1−δ, all estimates
pˆi ∈ [pi±(Ui + α2 )]. Whenever this occurs,
∆˜Iˆ = (pi∗ − Ui∗)− (pIˆ + UIˆ) ≤ (pˆi∗ + α2 )− (pˆIˆ − α2 ) ≤ α,
implying that Iˆ is α-suboptimal. The sample complexity bound is clear.
3.2 Instance-adaptive Algorithms
The sample complexity of the simple Algorithm 1 is not adaptive to the difficulty of the
actual instance: an arm is sampled nα/2,δ/k times even if it is far from α-suboptimal
(meaning that ∆˜i ≫ α) and could potentially be eliminated much more quickly. In
this subsection, we obtain such an instance-adaptive sample complexity by modifying the
Successive Elimination algorithm of [Even-Dar et al., 2006], which was originally designed
for the classical multi-armed bandit problem.
Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 2. At each round r, Algorithm 2 gets a single
new sample from each remaining arm in order to update its estimate pˆi,r. Then, for the
next round r + 1, it only keeps the arms i whose estimates pˆi,r are α-close to the best
estimate, where the threshold α is updated at each round. The algorithm and analysis
are almost identical to the original. As such, proof details are deferred to Appendix C.
The main difference is that in the proof of correctness, we show the event {|pˆi,r − pi| ≤
Ui + αr,6δ/(pi2kr2), ∀r ∈ [R], ∀i ∈ Sr} occurs with probability at least 1 − δ. This ensures
that in each round r, each estimate pˆi,r is accurate enough to use for the elimination step.
Note that Algorithm 2 returns the optimal arm w.h.p. (without knowing the smallest
effective gap), unlike Algorithm 1 above which only returns a near-optimal arm w.h.p.
Theorem 3. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). With probability at least 1 − δ, Algorithm 2 outputs the
optimal arm after using at most O
(∑
i 6=i∗
1
∆˜2i
log
(
k
δ∆˜i
))
samples.
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Moreover, as noted in Remark 9 of [Even-Dar et al., 2006], Algorithm 2 is easily modi-
fied (by simply terminating early) to be an (α, δ)-PAC algorithm with sample complexity
O

Nα
α2
log
(
Nα
δ
)
+
∑
i∈[k] : ∆˜i>α
1
∆˜2i
log
(
k
δ∆˜i
) ,
where Nα is the number of α-suboptimal arms with ∆˜i ≤ α.
Remark 4. In the multi-armed bandit literature, the sample complexity of the Successive
Elimination algorithm (tight up to a logarithmic factor) was improved upon by [Karnin et al.,
2013]’s Exponential-Gap Elimination (EGE) algorithm (tight up to a doubly logarithmic
factor). A natural idea is to analogously improve upon the PIBAI guarantee in Theorem 3
by adapting the EGE algorithm. However, this approach does not work. The same holds
for adapting the Median Elimination algorithm of [Even-Dar et al., 2006] and the PRISM
algorithm of [Jamieson et al., 2013]. The reason for the inadaptability of these algorithms
– in contrast to the easy adaptability of the Successive Elimination algorithm above – is
that these algorithms heavily rely on the “additive property of suboptimality” for BAI:
“If arm i has ∆i suboptimality gap w.r.t. the optimal arm i
∗, and if arm j has ∆(i)j
suboptimality gap w.r.t. arm i, then arm j has suboptimality gap ∆j = ∆i + ∆
(i)
j
w.r.t. the optimal arm i∗.”
The critical point is that PIBAI does not have this property since errors propagate from
adding the uncertainties Ui in the suboptimality gaps: that is, (pi∗ − Ui∗) − (pj + Uj) 6=
[(pi∗ − Ui∗)− (pi + Ui)]+ [(pi − Ui)− (pj + Uj)]. Because of this, in order to return an α-
suboptimal arm for PIBAI, we must ensure that all arms that are more than α-suboptimal
are eliminated before the optimal arm is eliminated (if it ever is). This is in contrast to
BAI in the classical multi-armed bandit setup: there, it is not problematic if the best (or
even currently best) arm is eliminated at round r, so long as the best arm in consecutive
rounds r and r+1 changes at most by a small amount.3 We stress that this nuance is not
merely a technicality but actually fundamental to the correctness proofs for PIBAI.
4 Finding the Best Median
The previous section provided algorithms for the general PIBAI problem; in this section,
these algorithms are adapted to the special case of the CBAI problem, which is the fo-
cus of the paper. This requires an estimator of the median from contaminated samples
that concentrates at an exponential rate4. Subsection 4.1 develops these statistical results,
which are of potential independent interest to the robust statistics community. Subsec-
tion 4.2 then combines these results with the results of the previous section to conclude
algorithms for CBAI, and gives upper bounds on their sample complexity. Finally, Sub-
section 4.3 gives information-theoretic lower bounds showing that the sample complexities
of these algorithms are optimal (up to a small logarithmic factor).
3In particular, at most 2−rα for most of these aforementioned algorithms, since this implies that the
final arm Iˆ is at most
∑
∞
r=1
2−rα = α-suboptimal.
4For the formal statement, see (ii) in the definition of PIBAI in Section 3.
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4.1 Estimation of Median from Contaminated Samples
In this subsection, we develop the statistical results needed to obtain algorithms for the
CBAI problem. Specifically, we obtain tight, non-asymptotic sample-complexity bounds
for median estimation from contaminated samples. We do this for all three adversarial
models for the contamination (oblivious, prescient, and malicious). These results may be
of independent interest to the robust statistics community.
The subsection is organized as follows. First, Subsection 4.1.1 studies the concen-
tration of the empirical median under the most general distributional assumptions and
provides, for all three adversarial settings, tight upper and lower bounds on the sample
complexity of median estimation from contaminated samples. Next, in Subsection 4.1.2
we obtain more algorithmically useful guarantees by specializing these results to a family
of distributions where the cdfs increase at least linearly in a neighborhood of the median,
a very common assumption in the robust estimation literature. For this family of distribu-
tions, we explicitly compute for all three adversarial settings the unavoidable bias terms
mentioned in Section 2 for median estimation from contaminated samples. It is worth em-
phasizing that these results precisely quantify the effect of the three different adversarial
strengths on the complexity of the problem of median estimation in the contamination
model.
Throughout this subsection, we will only consider a single arm, and its true distribution
will be denoted by F . For brevity of the main text, all proofs are deferred to Appendix B.
4.1.1 General Concentration Results for Median Estimation
Lemma 1 implies that some control of the quantiles of F is necessary to obtain guarantees
for estimation of m1(F ) from contaminated samples. We begin by considering F in the
following family of distributions, which we stress makes the most general such assumption.
Definition 1. For any t¯ ∈ (0, 12 ) and any non-decreasing function R : [0, t¯]→ R≥0, define
Ht¯,R to be the family of all distributions F satisfying
R(t) ≥ max
{
QR,F
(
1
2
+ t
)
−m,m−QL,F
(
1
2
− t
)}
(3)
for any t ∈ [0, t¯] and any median m ∈ m1(F ).
In words, the function R dictates the the maximal deviation from the median that a
cdf F can have for all quantiles in a small neighborhood [12 − t¯, 12 + t¯] around the median.
SinceR is an arbitrary non-decreasing function, Definition 1 gives the most general possible
bound on these quantiles.
Note that if ε > ε¯(t¯) := 2t¯1+2t¯ , it is impossible to control the deviation of the contami-
nated median from the true median for F ∈ Ht¯,R. Indeed, the requirement ε ≤ ε¯(t¯) := 2t¯1+2t¯
is equivalent to t¯ ≥ ε2(1−ε) , which, by Lemma 1, is the largest possible deviation from the
1
2 -quantile.
Combining Lemma 1 with the definition of R in Definition 1 immediately yields the
following tight bound on how far the contaminated median can be moved from the true
median for any F ∈ Ht¯,R.
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Corollary 5. For any t¯ ∈ (0, 12 ), any ε ∈ (0, ε¯(t¯)), and any non-decreasing function
R : [0, t¯]→ R≥0,
sup
F∈Ht¯,R, m∈m1(F ),
distribution G, m˜∈m1((1−ε)F+εG)
|m˜−m| = R
(
ε
2(1 − ε)
)
We now turn to estimation results. At this point it is necessary to distinguish between
the three adversarial settings for the contamination. We begin with guarantees for the
oblivious and prescient adversarial settings, which – somewhat surprisingly – turn out
to have the same rates. In particular, we show that with probability at least 1 − δ, the
estimation error is bounded above by R( ε2(1−ε) +O(
√
log 1/δ
n )). Note that if R is Lipschitz,
then this quantity is bounded above by the unavoidable uncertainty term R
(
ε
2(1−ε)
)
(see
Corollary 5) plus an error term that decays quickly with n−1/2 rate and has sub-Gaussian
tails in δ. This confidence-interval term is of optimal order since it is tight even for
estimating the mean (and thus median) of a Gaussian random variable with known unit
variance from uncontaminated samples.
Lemma 6. Let t¯ ∈ (0, 12 ), ε ∈ (0, ε¯(t¯)), and F ∈ Ht¯,R. Let Yi ∼ F and Di ∼ Ber(ε), for
i ∈ [n], all be drawn independently. Let {Zi}i∈[n] be arbitrary random variables possibly
depending on {Yi,Di}i∈[n], and define Xi = (1 −Di)Yi +DiZi. Then, for any confidence
level δ ∈ (0, 1) and number of samples n ≥ 2
(
t¯− ε2(1−ε)
)−2
log 2δ , we have
P
(
sup
m∈m1(F )
|mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn)−m| ≤ R
(
ε
2(1− ε) +
√
2 log(2/δ)
n
))
≥ 1− δ.
Note that because the class Ht¯,R only assumes control on the [12±t¯] quantiles, the
minimum sample complexity n must grow as t¯ approaches ε2(1−ε) , since by Lemma 1 this
is the largest quantile deviation that the contaminated median can be moved from the
true median.
We now turn to malicious adversaries and derive analogous tight, non-asymptotic
sample complexity bounds for median estimation from contaminated samples. We show
that it possible to obtain estimation accuracy of R(ε) in this malicious adversarial setting
(Lemma 7). Note that this is weaker than the the accuracy of R( ε2(1−ε)) obtained above
against oblivious and prescient adversaries. However, we also show that this dependency
is tight and unavoidable (Lemma 8). Moreover, the O(
√
log 1/δ
n ) error term in Lemma 7
is tight for the same reason as it was in Lemma 6; see the discussion there. Finally, we
remark that the upper bound on ε and the lower bound on the sample complexity n in
Lemma 7 are exactly the analogues of the corresponding bounds in Lemma 6; the only
difference is that malicious adversaries can force the contaminated distributions to have
medians at roughly F−1(12±ε), resulting in our need for control of these further quantiles.
Lemma 7. Let t¯ ∈ (0, 12), ε ∈ (0, t¯), and F ∈ Ht¯,R. Let (Yi,Di), for i ∈ [n], be drawn
independently with marginals Yi ∼ F and Di ∼ Ber(ε). Let {Zi}i∈[n] be arbitrary random
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variables possibly depending on {Yi,Di}i∈[n], and define Xi = (1−Di)Yi+DiZi. Then for
any confidence level δ ∈ (0, 1) and number of samples n ≥ 2 (t¯− ε)−2 log 3δ ,
P
(
sup
m∈m1(F )
|mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn)−m| ≤ R
(
ε+
√
2 log(3/δ)
n
))
≥ 1− δ.
Lemma 8. Let t¯ ∈ (0, 12), ε ∈ (0, t¯), δ ∈ (0, 1), n ≥ 12ε−2 log 1δ , and R : [0, t¯] → R≥0 be
any strictly increasing function. Then there exists a distribution F ∈ Ht¯,R and a joint
distribution on (D,Y,Z) with marginals D ∼ Ber(ε) and Y ∼ F , such that F has unique
median and
P
(
|mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn)−m1(F )| ≥ R
(
ε−
√
log(1/δ)
2n
))
≥ 1− δ,
where each {(Di, Yi, Zi)}i∈[n] is drawn independently from the joint distribution, and Xi :=
(1−Di)Yi +DiZi.
4.1.2 Improved Concentration under Quantile Control
Note that if a cdf F changes little around its median, then the neighboring quantiles
are harder to distinguish from each other, and thus it is more difficult to estimate the
median. In order to obtain more algorithmically useful rates for median estimation from
contaminated samples, we now introduce a more specific class of cdfs F that increase at
least linearly in a neighborhood around the median. This ensures that F is not “too flat”
in this neighborhood, which we stress is a very standard assumption for median estimation.
Definition 2. For any t¯ ∈ (0, 12 ) and B > 0, let Ft¯,B be the family of distributions F that
have a unique median and satisfy
|F (x1)− F (x2)| ≥ 1
Bm2(F )
|x1 − x2| (4)
for all x1, x2 ∈
[
QL,F (
1
2 − t¯), QR,F (12 + t¯)
]
.
We make a few remarks about the definition. i) Requiring the right-hand side of (4)
to scale inversely in the median absolute deviation (MAD) m2(F ) ensures closure of Ft¯,B
under scaling; see below. We also mention that m2(F ) is a robust measure of the spread
of F (it is the “median moment” analogue of variance), and controls the width of the
median’s unidentifiability region. ii) If F ∈ Ft¯,B, then F ∈ Ht¯,R for R(t) = Bm2(F )t. iii)
Distributions in Ft¯,B are not required to have densities, nor even be continuous. iv) The
family Ft¯,B has many natural and expected properties, such as closure under scaling and
translation. These properties are gathered in Lemma 23, which is deferred to Appendix A
for brevity of the main text.
Remark 9 (Examples). Most common distributions belong to Ft¯,B for some values of the
parameters t¯ and B. Moreover, by Lemma 23, if a distribution is in Ft¯,B, then all scaled
and translated versions are as well. A short list includes: i) the Gaussian distribution,
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for any t¯ ∈ (0, 12 ) and any B ≥
q3/4
φ(q1/2+t¯)
, where φ is the standard Gaussian density and
qα is the corresponding α-quantile; ii) the uniform distribution on any interval, for any
t¯ ∈ (0, 12) and any B ≥ 4; and iii) any distribution F with positive density F ′, for any
t¯ ∈ (0, 12) and any B ≥
(
m2(F )minx∈[QL,F ( 12−t¯),QR,F (
1
2+t¯)]
F ′(x)
)−1
.
We now apply the estimation results for Ht¯,R to estimation for Ft¯,B . By Lemma 23,
whenever F ∈ Ft¯,B, then F ∈ Ht¯,R for R(t) = tBm2(F ). Corollary 5 immediately yields
a bound on the size of the contamination region in terms of the quantity
Uε,B,m2 := Bm2
ε
2(1 − ε) .
Corollary 10. For any t¯ ∈ (0, 12), any ε ∈ (0, ε¯(t¯)), and any F ∈ Ft¯,B,
sup
distribution G,
m˜∈m1((1−ε)F+εG)
|m˜−m1(F )| ≤ Uε,B,m2(F ).
Remark 11 (Tightness of Corollary 10). For any a > 0, let F be the uniform distribution
over [0, a]. Then m1(F ) =
a
2 and m2(F ) =
a
4 , and thus F ∈ Ft¯,B for any t¯ ∈ (0, 12)
and B = 4. Now for any ε ∈ (0, ε¯(t¯)) ⊂ (0, 12), let G be the uniform distribution over
[a, a1−ε ]. Then F˜ = (1− ε)F + εG is the uniform distribution over [0, a1−ε ] and has median
m1(F ) =
a
2 +
ε
2(1−ε)a = m1(F ) + Uε,B,m2(F ). An identical argument on F (−·) and G(−·)
yields an example where the median decreases by −Uε,B,m2(F ), so the bound in Corollary 10
is tight.
Now we turn to median estimation bounds for Ft¯,B. Since R(t) = tBm2(F ) is clearly
Lipschitz, the discussion preceding Lemmas 6 and 7 about the optimality of the following
error bounds applies. That is, the error decomposes into the sum of the unavoidable uncer-
tainty term Uε,B,m2(F ) plus a confidence-interval term decaying at a n
−1/2 rate and with
sub-Gaussian tails in δ, both of which are optimal. The t¯ terms in the sample complexity
bounds appear for the analogous reasons as in Lemma 6; see the discussion there. For
brevity, we omit the proofs of the following corollaries since they follow immediately from
Lemmas 6, 7, and 23.
Corollary 12. Consider the same setup as in Lemma 6, except with the added restriction
that F ∈ Ft¯,B. Then, for any confidence level δ ∈ (0, 1), error level E > 0, and number of
samples n ≥ 2max
(
B2m2
2
(F )
E2
,
(
t¯− ε2(1−ε)
)−2)
log 2δ , we have
P
(
|mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn)−m1(F )| ≤ Uε,B,m2(F ) + E
)
≥ 1− δ.
Corollary 13. Consider the same setup as in Lemma 7, except with the added restriction
that F ∈ Ft¯,B. Then for any confidence level δ ∈ (0, 1), error level E > 0, and number of
samples n ≥ 2max
(
B2m2
2
(F )
E2
, (t¯− ε)−2
)
log 3δ ,
P
(
|mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn)−m1(F )| ≤ U (malicious)ε,B,m2(F ) + E
)
≥ 1− δ.
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In Corollary 13 above, we have defined
U
(malicious)
ε,B,m2
:= Bm2ε,
which is a tight bound on the uncertainty in median estimation that a malicious adversary
can induce (see Lemma 8).
4.2 Algorithms
In this subsection, we apply the algorithms developed in Section 3 for the general problem
of PIBAI to the special case of CBAI. In order to implement the estimator required by
part (ii) of the definition of PIBAI (see Section 3), we make use of the guarantees proved
in Subsection 4.1 for median estimation from contaminated samples. Nearly matching
information-theoretic lower bounds are provided in the following subsection and show
that the algorithms below have optimal sample complexity (up to a small logarithmic
factor).
We will only assume that the arms’ distributions are in Ft¯,B and have robust second
moments uniformly bounded5 by some m¯2; this will allow us to perform median estimation
from contaminated samples. For simplicity, the parameters of this family are assumed to
be known to the algorithm beforehand6. Note, however, that it is not necessary to know
ε, but only an upper bound ε0 on ε; indeed ε can be replaced with ε0 in all our algorithms.
It is very standard in the robust statistics literature to assume knowledge of such an upper
bound ε0 on the amount of contamination. The parameter t¯ can then be arbitrarily chosen
by the algorithms, so long as it is bigger than ε0/(2(1 − ε0)) (or ε0 in the malicious case)
and smaller than 1/2.
The sample complexities we prove below are in terms of the effective gaps ∆˜i :=
(m1(Fi∗)−Ui∗)−(m1(Fi)+Ui) of the suboptimal arms i 6= i∗, where i∗ := argmaxi∈[k]m1(Fi)
is the arm with the highest median. Here Ui is the unavoidable uncertainty term for
median estimation from contaminated samples under the given adversarial setting. In
Subsection 4.1, we explicitly computed Ui = Uε,B,m2(Fi) for oblivious and prescient adver-
saries (Corollary 12) and Ui = U
(malicious)
ε,B,m2(Fi)
for malicious adversaries (Corollary 13). We
emphasize that the strength of the adversarial setting is encapsulated in the corresponding
Ui.
5It is typically necessary to have bounds on higher order moments in order to control the error of
estimating lower order moments, see e.g. [Bubeck et al., 2013].
6The classes of distributions that we define have two parameters that would be hard or even impossible
to estimate in practice, namely B and m¯2. In classical setups in which algorithms need to learn means
instead of medians, it is common to assume that there is a second moment σ2 which is known, or at least
bounded by a known constant. This is because in practice σ2 is hard to estimate from the data. Note that
if the distributions Fi are known to have bounded support, m¯2 can be chosen as the size of the domain.
It seems that knowing B is the price to pay to go from the classical to the robust setup. Indeed, even
in the non-contaminated case, it is well known that the median of a distribution can be estimated at a
parametric rate only when the distribution is not too flat around its median. In that case, the estimation
rate depends on how “non-flat” the distribution is, which is exactly Bm2(F ) in the present setup. In a
parametric setup, i.e., when the distributions of the arms Fi, i = 1, . . . ,K are known up to some location
and/or scale parameters, B would be known since it is translation and scale invariant (see Lemma 23).
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S ← [k], r ← 1
Sample each arm ⌈N log(pi2k2δ )⌉ times
while |S| > 1 do
Sample each arm i ∈ S for 1 + ⌈2N log( r+1r )⌉ times and produce pˆi,r from all
past samples
S ← {i ∈ S : pˆi,r ≥ maxj∈S pˆj,r − 2αr,6δ/(pi2kr2)}
r ← r + 1
end
Output the only arm left in S
Algorithm 3: Adaptation of successive elimination algorithm (see Algorithm 2)
for CBAI. For oblivious and prescient adversaries, N := 2(t¯ − ε2(1−ε))−2; and for
malicious adversaries N := 2(t¯− ε)−2. In all settings, αr,δ :=
√
2Bm¯2
2
log 3
δ
r .
First, we discuss how the simple Algorithm 1 yields an (α, δ)-PAC algorithm for
CBAI without modification. In this setting, pˆi is the empirical median of the payoffs
of arm i. The quantity nα,δ is equal to 2max(
B2m¯2
2
α2
, (t¯ − ε2(1−ε))−2) log 2δ against oblivi-
ous and prescient adversaries (Corollary 12) and is equal to 2max(
B2m¯2
2
α2
, (t¯− ε)−2) log 3δ
against malicious adversaries (Corollary 13). Theorem 2 along with the observation that
the constant term in the sample complexity nα,δ only introduces a term that is negligible
in the overall sample complexity of Algorithm 1, immediately yields the following result.
Theorem 14. Let Fi ∈ Ft¯,B with m2(F ) ≤ m¯2 for each arm i ∈ [k], and let the adversary
be oblivious, prescient, or malicious. For any α > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), Algorithm 1 is an
(α, δ)-PAC CBAI algorithm with sample complexity O(knα/2,δ/k) = O
(
k
α2
log kδ
)
.
Algorithm 1 does not adapt to the difficulty of the problem instance. A natural
approach is to try to apply the Successive Elimination Algorithm to BAI directly. Un-
fortunately, this algorithm needs concentration inequalities even for small sample sizes,
whereas our guarantees are only valid when the sample size is greater than a certain
threshold. Hence, we slightly modify the Successive Elimination Algorithm to obtain ad-
ditional samples in an initial exploration phase; the number of samples required in this
initial exploration phase is dictated by our median estimation results form Subsection 4.1.
We similarly modify later rounds to take additional samples in order to produce updated
median estimates at the desired certainty levels. Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 3.
Theorem 15. Let δ ∈ (0, 1), let Fi ∈ Ft¯,B with m2(F ) ≤ m¯2 for each arm i ∈ [k], and let
the adversary be either oblivious, prescient, or malicious. With probability at least 1 − δ,
Algorithm 3 outputs the optimal arm after using at most O˜
(∑
i 6=i∗
(
1
∆˜2i
+N
)
log
(
k
δ∆˜i
))
samples.
The proof follows from Theorem 3 and is deferred to Appendix C. Like Algorithm 2,
Algorithm 3 can be stopped earlier in order to obtain an (α, δ)-PAC guarantee.
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4.3 Lower Bounds
Here we provide information-theoretic lower bounds on the sample complexity of the
CBAI problem that match, up to small logarithmic factors, the algorithmic upper bounds
proved above in Subsection 4.2 for each of the three adversarial settings. The main in-
sight is that we can reduce hard instances of the BAI problem to hard instances of the
CBAI problem. In this way, we can leverage the sophisticated lower bounds already de-
veloped in the classical multi-armed bandit literature.
Let i∗ := argmaxi∈[k]m1(Fi) denote the optimal arm. As in Section 3, ∆˜i := (m1(Fi∗)−
Ui∗)− (m1(Fi) +Ui) denotes the effective gap for suboptimal arms i 6= i∗, and Ui denotes
the unavoidable uncertainty term for median estimation. We emphasize that since the
power of the adversary is encapsulated in the Ui, and therefore also the effective gaps ∆˜i,
we can address all three adversarial settings simultaneously by proving a lower bound in
terms of the effective gaps.
In Section 3, we argued that the PIBAI problem is impossible when there exists sub-
optimal arms with non-positive effective gaps; the CBAI problem also has this property.
Indeed, if i 6= i∗ satisfies ∆˜i ≤ 0, then there exist distributions Gi∗ and Gi such that the
resulting contaminated distributions F˜i := (1 − ε)Fi + εGi and F˜i∗ := (1 − ε)Fi∗ + εGi∗
have equal medians. Moreover, since the distributions F are arbitrary (CBAI makes no
parameteric assumptions), it is impossible to determine whether arm i or i∗ has a higher
true median. Thus, any CBAI algorithm, even with infinite samples, cannot succeed with
probability more than 12 . Therefore, we only consider the setting where all effective gaps
∆˜i are strictly positive.
The results in this section lower bound the sample complexity of any CBAI algorithm
in terms of the effective gaps. We will focus on lower bounds for the function class Ft¯,B
and provide lower bounds matching the upper bounds for CBAI in Section 4.2.
Theorem 16. Consider CBAI against an oblivious, prescient, or malicious adversary.
There exists a positive constant B such that for any number of arms k ≥ 2, any confidence
level δ ∈ (0, 320 ), any suboptimality level α ∈ (0, 16), any contamination level ε ∈ (0, 115),
any regularity level t¯ ∈ (0, 110), and any effective gaps {∆˜i}i∈[k]\i∗ ⊂ (0, 13 ), there exists a
CBAI instance with F1, . . . , Fk ∈ Ft¯,B for which any (α, δ)-PAC algorithm has expected
sample complexity
E[T ] = Ω

 ∑
i∈[k]\{i∗}
1
max(∆˜i, α)2
log 1δ

 ,
where i∗ = argmaxi∈[k]m1(Fi) is the optimal arm.
Taking the limit as α→ 0 in Theorem 16 immediately yields the following lower bound
on (0, δ)-PAC algorithms.
Corollary 17. Consider the same setup as in Theorem 16. There exists a CBAI instance
F1, . . . , Fk ∈ Ft¯,B for which any (0, δ)-PAC algorithm has expected sample complexity
E[T ] = Ω

 ∑
i∈[k]\{i∗}
1
∆˜2i
log 1δ

 .
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Proof Sketches. We now sketch the proofs of Theorem 16 and Corollary 17. Full details
are deferred to Appendix D.remove for brevity of the main text.
The key idea in the proof is to “lift” hard BAI instances to hard CBAI problem in-
stances. Specifically, let {Pi}i∈[k] be distributions for arms in a BAI problem, let {Ui}i∈[k]
be the corresponding unavoidable uncertainties for median estimation of Pi in CBAI , and
let i∗ denote the best arm. We say {Pi}i∈[k] admits an “(ε,Ft¯,B)CBAI-lifting” to {Fi}i∈[k]
if (i) Fi ∈ Ft¯,B for each i, (ii) there exists some adversarial distributions {Gi}i∈[k] such
that each Pi = (1 − ε)Fi + εGi; and (iii) the effective gaps ∆˜i for the {Fi}i∈[k] are equal
to the gaps ∆i in the original BAI problem. Intuitively, such a lifting can be thought of
as choosing Fi∗ to have the smallest possible median and the other Fi to have the largest
possible median, which still being consistent with Pi and remaining in the uncertainty
region corresponding to the Ui.
Armed with this informal definition, we now outline the central idea behind the reduc-
tion. Let {Pi}i∈[k] be a “hard” BAI instance with best arm i∗, and assume it admits an
(ε,Ft¯,B)-CBAI-lifting to {Fi}i∈[k]. Consider running a CBAI algorithm A on the samples
obtained from {Pi}; we claim that if A is (α, δ)-PAC, then it must output an α-suboptimal
arm for the original BAI problem. Indeed, by (ii), the samples from the BAI instance have
the same law as the samples that would be obtained from the CBAI problem with {Fi},
and by (iii), the effective gaps in the CBAI problem are equal to the gaps in the original
problem. Therefore, A must have sample complexity for this problem that is no smaller
than the sample complexity of the best BAI algorithm.
Note that the {Fi} in the above lifting need only exist, as we do not explicitly use
these distributions but instead simply run A on samples from the original bandit instance.
Ensuring the existence of such a lifting is the main obstacle, due the following technical yet
important nuance: most BAI lower bounds are constructed from Bernoulli or Gaussian
distributions, neither of which is compatible with the reduction described above. The
problem with Bernoulli arms is that they do not have liftings to Ft¯,B : any resulting Fi
would not satisfy (4) and thus cannot be in Ft¯,B. Gaussian arms run into a different
problem: it is not clear how to shift Gaussian arms up or down far enough to change
the median by exactly the maximum uncertainty amount Ui. We overcome this nuance
by considering arms with smoothed Bernoulli distribution SBer(p), which we define to be
the uniform mixture between a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p and a uniform
distribution over [0, 1]. Indeed, this distribution is (ε,Ft¯,B)-CBAI-liftable: unlike the
Bernoulli distribution, it is smooth enough to have liftings in Ft¯,B; and unlike the Gaussian
distribution, the median of the appropriate lifting of SBer(p) is exactly Ui away from the
median of SBer(p). Both of these facts are simple calculations; see Appendix D for details.
The only ingredient remaining in the proof is to prove that there are hard instances
for BAI with SBer-distributed arms, which follows easily from Lemma 1 and Remark 5 in
Kaufmann et al. [2016].
5 Quality Guarantees for the Selected Arm
In the previous Section 4, we developed algorithms for CBAI and proved that they select
the best (or an approximately best) arm with high probability. However, in many appli-
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cations, it is desirable to also provide guarantees on the quality of the selected arm such
as “with probability at least 80%, a new random variable Y ∼ FIˆ is at least 10.”
Such a quality guarantee could be accomplished directly using the machinery developed
earlier in Subsection 4.1 by, for example, estimating the 0.2 quantile in addition to the
median (the 0.5 quantile). However, this approach has two problems. First, if we would
like to obtain such a guarantee for multiple probability levels (such as 55%, 60%, . . . , etc.)
we would have to perform a separate estimation for each of the corresponding quantiles.
Second, and more importantly, estimation of a quantile q from contaminated samples
requires control of quantiles in a ε2(1−ε) neighborhood of q (this follows by an identical
argument as in Lemma 1), which can severely restrict the range of quantiles that are
possible to estimate.
We circument both of these problems by estimating the median absolute deviation
(MAD) in addition to the median. The MAD describes the scale of the tails of a distribu-
tion away from the median and is the appropriate analogue to variance (which may not
exist for F and, we stress, is not estimable from contaminated samples) for this contami-
nation model setting.
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 5.1 develops these statistical results
for estimation of the MAD from contaminated samples. Subsection 5.2 then uses these
results to prove that the CBAI algorithms presented earlier in Subsection 4.2 – with no
additional modifications – can also provide quality guarantees for the selected arm. That
is, we show that in addition to outputting the best (or an approximately best) arm, these
algorithms also provide quality guarantees to a certain precision “for free” without needing
extra samples.
5.1 Estimation of Second Robust Moment from Contaminated Samples
In this subsection, we develop the statistical results needed to obtain quality guarantees
for the selected arm in the CBAI problem. Specifically, we consider only a single arm
and obtain non-asymptotic sample-complexity bounds for estimation of the second robust
moment (the MAD) from contaminated samples. We do this for all three adversarial
models for the contamination (oblivious, prescient, and malicious). These results may be
of independent interest to the robust statistics community.
The subsection is organized as follows. First, Subsection 5.1.1 introduces a class of
distributions for which the MAD is estimable from contaminated samples. The few as-
sumptions we make are common in the statistics literature, and we give multiple examples
showing that many common distributions are included in this class. Subsection 5.1.2 then
proves finite-sample guarantees for MAD estimation from contaminated samples for this
class of distributions and for all three adversarial contamination settings.
5.1.1 A Class of Distributions with Estimable Second Robust Moment
Like the median, the MAD is not fully identifiable from contaminated samples (see the
discussion in Section 2.2). However, we can estimate the MAD up to a reasonable region
of uncertainty with only a few additional assumptions.
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Definition 3. For any t¯ ∈ (0, 12 ), B > 0, m¯2 > 0, and κ ≥ 0, let Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ be the family
of distributions F with unique robust moments m1(F ), m2(F ), and m4(F ) satisfying:
(i) (4) holds for all x1, x2 ∈
[
QL,F (
1
2 − t¯), QR,F (12 + t¯)
] ∪ [m1(F )±2m2(F )].
(ii) m2(F ) ≤ m¯2.
(iii) m2(F ) ≤ κm4(F ).
Let us make a few remarks on this definition. i) We emphasize that ourCBAI algorithms
already have optimality guarantees when the arm distributions are in Ft¯,B (see Section 4.2);
the additional assumption that the arm distributions are in Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ allows us to also ob-
tain quantile guarantees on the arm returned by the algorithm (see Section 5.2). ii) Prop-
erty (iii) of the definition requires a bound on the fourth robust moment, the strength of
which is dictated by the parameter κ. Informally, higher robust moments are necessary
to control the error of estimation of lower robust moments, analogous to how bounds on
variance (resp. kurtosis) are typically necessary for estimation of a distribution’s mean
(resp. variance). iii) Note that distributions in Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ are not required to have densi-
ties, nor even be continuous. iv) The family Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ satisfies some natural and expected
properties, such as closure under translation. These properties are gathered and proved
in Lemma 23, which is deferred to Appendix A for brevity of the main text.
Remark 18 (Examples). Many common distributions (e.g. the normal distribution, the
uniform distribution, the Cauchy distribution, etc.) belong to Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ for some values
of the parameters t¯, B, m¯2, and κ. For instance, the uniform distribution on the interval
[a, b] is in Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ for any t¯ ∈ (0, 12), any B ≥ 4, any κ ≥ 2, and any m¯2 ≥ b−a4 . Another
example is that the Cauchy distribution with scale parameter a belongs to Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ for any
t¯ ∈ (0, 12), any B ≥ π(1 +max(1, tan(πt¯)2)), and κ ≥
√
3− 1, and any m¯2 ≥ a. We recall
that a Cauchy distribution with scale parameter a > 0 has density
1
πa
1
1 +
(
x−x0
a
)2 , x ∈ R,
where x0 ∈ R is a location parameter. For such a distribution, it is easy to check that
m1(F ) = x0, m2(F ) = a and m4(F ) = a(
√
3 − 1). Note that neither the mean nor the
variance exists for the Cauchy distribution.
5.1.2 Concentration Results for Estimation of Second Robust Moment
We are now ready to present finite-sample guarantees on the speed of convergence of the
empirical MAD mˆ2 to the underlying distribution’s MAD m2 when given contaminated
samples. For brevity, proofs are deferred to Appendix B.3.
We first present results for the oblivious and prescient adversarial settings. As before,
the estimation error decomposes into the sum of two terms: a bias term reflecting the
uncertainty the adversary can inject given her contamination level, and a confidence-
interval term that shrinks with an optimal n−1/2 rate and has sub-Gaussian tails in δ.
Lemma 19. Let t¯ ∈ (0, 12), ε ∈ (0,min(ε¯(t¯), 1B )), and F ∈ Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ. Let Yi ∼ F and
Di ∼ Ber(ε), for i ∈ [n], all be drawn independently. Let {Zi}i∈[n] be arbitrary ran-
dom variables possibly depending on {Yi,Di}i∈[n], and define Xi = (1 − Di)Yi + DiZi.
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Then, for any confidence level δ > 0, error level E > 0, and number of samples n ≥
2max
(
16κ2B2m¯2
2
E2
,
(
min(t¯, 1B )− ε2(1−ε)
)−2)
log 4δ ,
P
(
|mˆ2(X1, . . . ,Xn)−m2(F )| ≤ (1 + 2κ)Uε,B,m2(F ) + E
)
≥ 1− δ.
Similar to median estimation above, it is possible to estimate the MAD even in the
malicious adversarial setting.
Lemma 20. Let t¯ ∈ (0, 12 ), ε ∈ (0,min(t¯, 1B )), and F ∈ Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ. Let (Yi,Di), for i ∈ [n],
be drawn independently with marginals Yi ∼ F and Di ∼ Ber(ε). Let {Zi}i∈[n] be arbitrary
random variables possibly depending on {Yi,Di}i∈[n], and define Xi = (1 −Di)Yi +DiZi.
Then, for any confidence level δ > 0, error level E > 0, and number of samples n ≥
2max
(
16κ2B2m¯2
2
E2
,
(
min(t¯, 1B )− ε
)−2)
log 6δ ,
P
(
|mˆ2(X1, . . . ,Xn)−m2(F )| ≤ (1 + 2κ)U (malicious)ε,B,m2(F ) +E
)
≥ 1− δ.
5.2 Algorithmic Guarantees
We now apply these statistical results for MAD estimation to show that theCBAI algorithms
presented earlier in Subsection 4.2 – with no additional modifications – can also provide
quality guarantees for the arm they select. That is, we show that in addition to outputting
the best (or an approximately best) arm, these algorithms also provide quality guarantees
to a certain precision “for free” without needing extra samples.
For simplicity, we will focus on error guarantees for Algorithm 1. A nearly identical
(yet technically hairier) argument yields a similar guarantee for our adaptation of the
Successive Elimination algorithm for CBAI (Algorithm 3).
We will make the assumption that the arms distributions are in Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ so that
the MAD estimation results proved above will apply. The parameters of this family are
assumed to be known to the algorithm beforehand. Distributions in Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ have the
following property that their lower tails are controlled by their median and MAD.
Lemma 21. Let F ∈ Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ and Y ∼ F . Then simultaneously for all t ∈ [0, t¯],
P
(
Y ≥ m1(F )− tBm2(F )
)
≥ 12 + t.
Proof. By item (6) of Lemma 23, we have that for all t ∈ [0, t¯], t = 12 − (12 − t) ≥
1
Bm2(F )
(F−1(12) − F−1(12 − t)). Rearranging yields F−1(12 − t) ≥ m1(F ) − Bm2(F )t and
completes the proof.
With this lemma in hand, we turn to guarantees for the arm returned by Algorithm 1.
The following guarantees hold for all adversarial settings since the adversarial strength is
encapsulated in the definition of the unavoidable uncertainty terms Ui.
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Theorem 22. Let F1, . . . , Fk ∈ Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ. Let ε ∈ (0,min( 2t¯1+2t¯ , 1B )) and U¯ := Uε,B,m¯2 if
the adversary is oblivious or prescient, or let ε ∈ (0,min(t¯, 1B )) and U¯ := U
(malicious)
ε,B,m¯2
if the
adversary is malicious. Consider using Algorithm 1 for CBAI exactly as in Theorem 2.
Let Iˆ denote the arm it outputs, let Y be a random variable whose conditional distribution
on Iˆ is FIˆ , and let mˆ1 and mˆ2 denote the empirical median and MAD, respectively, from
the samples it has seen from FIˆ . Then, simultaneously for all t ∈ [0, t¯],
P
(
Y ≥ (mˆ1 − tBmˆ2)−
(
(12 + 2κtB)α + (1 + (1 + 2κ)Bt)U¯
) ) ≥ 12 + t− 3δk .
Proof. By definition of Algorithm 1, Iˆ is sampled nα/2,δ/k = 2max(
4B2m¯2
2
α2
, (t¯− ε2(1−ε))−2) log 2kδ
times against oblivious and prescient adversaries, and nα/2,δ/k = 2max
(
4B2m¯2
2
α2
, (t¯− ε)−2
)
log 3kδ
times against malicious adversaries. Therefore – by Corollary 12 and Lemma 19 for obliv-
ious and prescient adversaries, or similarly by Corollary 13 and Lemma 20 for malicious
adversaries – we have by a union bound that with probability at least 1− 3δk , both of the
following inequalities hold:
m1(FIˆ) ≥ mˆ1 − U¯ − α2 , and
m2(FIˆ) ≤ mˆ2 + (1 + 2κ)U¯ + 2κα.
Whenever this event occurs, we have
m1(FIˆ)− tBm2(FIˆ) ≥ (mˆ1 − tBmˆ2)−
(
(12 + 2κtB)α + (1 + (1 + 2κ)Bt)U¯
)
.
Applying Lemma 21 and taking a union bound completes the proof.
Note that the bound inside the probability term in Theorem 22 can be far less conser-
vative than the crude bound mˆ1 − tBm¯2 if ε and α are small.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the Best Arm Identification problem for contaminated bandits
(CBAI). This setup can model many practical applications that cannot be modeled by
the classical bandit setup. On the way to efficient algorithms for CBAI, we developed
tight, non-asymptotic sample-complexity bounds for estimation of the first two robust
moments (median and median absolute deviation) from contaminated samples. These
results may be of independent interest, perhaps as ingredients for adapting other online
learning techniques to similar contaminated settings.
We formalized the contaminated bandit setup as a special case of the more general
partially identifiable bandit problem (PIBAI), and presented ways to adapt celebrated
Best Arm Identification algorithms for the classical bandit setting to this PIBAI problem.
The sample complexity is essentially changed only by replacing the suboptimality “gaps”
with suboptimality “effective gaps” to adjust for the challenge of partial identifiability.
We then showed how these algorithms apply to the special case of CBAI by making use
of the aforementioned guarantees for estimating the median from contaminated samples.
26
We complemented these results with nearly matching information-theoretic lower bounds
on the sample complexity of CBAI, showing that (up to a small logarithmic factor) our
algorithms are optimal. This answers the question this paper set out to solve: determin-
ing the complexity of finding the arm with highest median given contaminated samples.
Finally, we used our statistical results on estimation of the second robust moment from
contaminated samples to show that without additional samples, our algorithms can also
output quality guarantees on the selected arm.
Our paper suggests several potential directions for future work.
• Our upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity of CBAI are off by a log-
arithmic factor in the number of arms. It is an interesting open question to close
this gap, especially since many of the tricks for doing this in the classical BAI setup
do not seem to extend to this partially identifiable setting (see Remark 4). One
concrete possibility is to obtain a tighter upper bound by adapting the algorithm
of [Jamieson et al., 2014] to the CBAI problem. This would require proving a non-
asymptotic version of the Law of the Iterated Logarithm for empirical medians,
which would be of independent interest.
• We have developed algorithms for online learning in the presence of partial identi-
fiability. How far does this toolkit extend? In particular, do our results apply to
more complicated or more general feedback structures such as partial monitoring
(see e.g. [Barto´k et al., 2014]) or graph feedback (see e.g. [Alon et al., 2017])?
• The contaminated bandit setup models many real-world problems that cannot be
modeled by the classical bandit setup. Is it applicable and approachable to formulate
other classical online-learning problems in similar contamination setups?
• More abstractly, we think that problems at the intersection of online learning and
robust statistics are not only mathematically rich, but also are increasingly relevant,
given the recent influx of active learning tasks with data that are not completely
trustworthy. It may be valuable to use techniques from one of the fields to approach
problems in the other, as we did here.
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A Properties of Ft¯,B and Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ
The following lemma lists some simple properties of Ft¯,B (defined in Definition 2) and
Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ (defined in Definition 3), which we use often throughout the paper.
For shorthand, we denote IF,t¯ :=
[
QL,F (
1
2 − t¯), QR,F (12 + t¯)
]
for a distribution F and
a real number t¯ ∈ (0, 12).
Lemma 23. If F ∈ Ft¯,B, then:
1. For any a 6= 0 and b ∈ R, the distribution F (a ·+b) is also in FB,t¯.
2. F is strictly monotonically increasing in IF,t¯.
3. QL,F (t) = QR,F (t), for all t ∈ F (IF,t¯) = [12±t¯].
4. QL,F (F (x)) = x for all x ∈ IF,t¯ and we write F−1 for QL,F = QR,F .
5. The left and right quantiles of F are equal in the interval F (IF,t¯) = [
1
2 − t¯, 12 + t¯].
6. For any u1, u2 ∈ F (IF,t¯) = [12 − t¯, 12 + t¯],
|u1 − u2| ≥ 1
Bm2(F )
|F−1(u1)− F−1(u2)|.
Moreover if we also have F ∈ Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ, then:
7. For any a 6= 0 and b ∈ R, the distribution F (a ·+b) is in FB,t¯,am¯2,κ.
8. Let H be the distribution of |Y − m|, where Y ∼ F . Then H ∈ Ft¯H ,BH , where
BH := κB and t¯H := min(
1
2 ,
2
B ).
Proof. When proved in order, all of these statements follow easily from the definition of
the function class and the earlier statements. The only part requiring effort is item 8,
which we now verify. Fix any r1, r2 ∈ IH,t¯H , where without loss of generality r1 ≥ r2 ≥ 0.
Then
H(r1)−H(r2) = P(|Y −m1(F )| ≤ r1)− P(|Y −m1(F )| ≤ r2)
= [P(Y ≤ m1(F ) + r1)− P(Y ≤ m1(F ) + r2)]
+ [P(Y < m1(F )− r2)− P(Y < m1(F )− r1)]
≥ F (m1(F ) + r1)− F (m1(F ) + r2)
≥ |r1 − r2|
Bm2(F )
(5)
≥ |r1 − r2|
κBm4(F )
=
|r1 − r2|
BHm2(H)
.
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The only step requiring justification is the inequality in (5): this is evident by (4) if
r1, r2 ∈ [m1(F )±2m2(F )], but this condition must be checked. Once we show this condition
is met, we are immediately done.
Therefore, it is now sufficient to prove that r1, r2 ∈ [m1(F )±2m2(F )]. Since r1, r2 ≥ 0,
it suffices to show that the largest value in IH,t¯H , namely QR,H(
1
2+ t¯H), is at most 2m2(F ).
And to show this, it suffices to show 12 + t¯H < H(2m2(F )). We show this last inequality
presently: by an similar argument as in the first few lines of the above display,
H(2m2(F ))− 12 = H(2m2(F ))−H(m2(F ))
= [P(Y ≤ m1(F ) + 2m2(F ))− P(Y ≤ m1(F ) +m2(F ))]
+ P(Y ∈ [m1(F )− 2m2(F ),m1(F )−m2(F )))
> F (m1(F ) + 2m2(F ))− F (m1(F ) +m2(F )) (6)
≥ 1
B
(7)
≥ t¯H ,
where (6) is because F is monotonically increasing in [m1(F )− 2m2(F ),m1(F )+2m2(F )]
by property (i) in the definition of Ft¯,B,m¯2,κ, and (7) is due to (4). This completes the
proof.
B Proofs for Estimation from Contaminated Samples
Throughout, we denote the indicator random variable for an event E by 1{E}.
B.1 Estimation of Median for Oblivious and Prescient Adversaries
Proof of Lemma 6. For shorthand, let mˆ := mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn) and let m ∈ m1(F ) be any
median of F . For each i ∈ [n], define the indicator random variable
Li := 1
{
(Di = 1) or
(
Di = 0 and Yi ≥ QR,F
(
1
2(1−ε) + a
))}
,
where a :=
√
log(2/δ)
(1−ε)√2n <
√
2 log(2/δ)
n . By independence of Di and Yi, Li has mean
E [Li] = ε+ (1− ε)
(
1−
(
1
2(1−ε) + a
))
= 12 − (1− ε)a.
Moreover, the {Li}i∈[n] are independent, and thus by Hoeffding’s inequality,
P
(
mˆ ≥ QR,F
(
1
2(1 − ε) + a
))
≤ P
(
n∑
i=1
Li ≥ n
2
)
≤ exp (−2n(1− ε)2a2) = δ
2
.
Therefore, with probability at least 1− δ2 ,
mˆ−m < QR,F
(
1
2(1 − ε) + a
)
−QR,F
(
1
2
)
≤ R
(
ε
2(1− ε) + a
)
,
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where the final inequality is due to (3), which we may invoke since 12 +
ε
2(1−ε) + a ≤ 12 + t¯
by our choice of n. An identical argument (or by symmetry with −F ) yields the analogous
result for the lower tail of mˆ, namely that m− mˆ < R( ε2(1−ε) +a) with probability at least
1− δ2 . The lemma statement follows by a union bound.
B.2 Estimation of Median for Malicious Adversaries
We now turn to providing the proofs of Lemma 7 and 8. Below, it will be convenient to
denote by y(k) the k-th order statistic of a (possibly random) sequence y1, . . . , yn ∈ R.
Informally, the proof of Lemma 7 proceeds by (i) showing that mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn) is
deterministically bounded within the order statistics Y(⌊n2 ⌋±
∑n
i=1Di)
(Lemma 24), (ii) ap-
plying Hoeffding’s inequality to argue that w.h.p., at most
∑n
i=1Di ≈ εn samples are
contaminated, and (iii) reusing the techniques of Lemma 6 to argue that w.h.p., the order
statistics of Y(⌊n2 ⌋±εn)
are within the desired error range from m1(F ). Since each of these
steps is tight up to a small amount of slack, the proof of the converse Lemma 8 proceeds
essentially by just showing that each of these steps occurs also in the opposite direction
w.h.p.
The following lemma will be helpful for step (i). Its proof is straightforward by induc-
tion on s and is thus omitted.
Lemma 24. Let xi := diyi + (1 − di)zi, where y1 ≤ · · · ≤ yn and z1, . . . , zn are arbitrary
real-valued sequences, and d1, . . . , dn is an arbitrary binary-valued sequence satisfying s :=∑n
i=1 di <
n
2 . Then
y(⌊n
2
⌋−s) ≤ mˆ1(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ y(⌈n
2
⌉+s).
Proof of Lemma 7. Define for shorthand a :=
√
log(3/δ)
2n . By Hoeffding’s inequality, the
event E := {∑ni=1Di ≤ (ε + a)n} occurs with probability at least P(E) ≥ 1 − δ3 . Since
ε+ a ≤ t¯ < 12 by our choice of n, Lemma 24 implies that, whenever E occurs,
Y(⌊n
2
⌋−⌊(ε+a)n⌋) ≤ mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn) ≤ Y(⌈n
2
⌉+⌊(ε+a)n⌋)
also occurs. Now, define for each i ∈ [n] the indicator random variable Li := 1
{
Yi > QR,F (
1
2 + ε+ 2a)
}
.
Then E[Li] ≤ 12 − ε− 2a, so by Hoeffding’s inequality,
P
(
Y(⌈n
2
⌉+⌊(ε+a)n⌋) > QR,F (12 + ε+ 2a)
)
≤ P
(
n∑
i=1
Li ≥ (12 − ε− a)n
)
≤ exp(−2na2) = δ
3
.
An identical argument (or simply by symmetry on F (−·)) also yields that Y(⌊n
2
⌋−⌊(ε+a)n⌋) <
QL,F (
1
2 − ε − 2a) with probability at most δ3 . We conclude by a union bound that with
probability at least 1− δ,
QL,F
(
1
2 − (ε+ 2a)
) ≤ mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn) ≤ QR,F (12 + (ε+ 2a)) .
Whenever this occurs, we have by virtue of (3) that supm∈m1(F ) |mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn)−m| ≤
R (ε+ 2a), since both 12±(ε+ 2a) ∈ [12±t¯] by our choice of n.
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Proof of Lemma 8. Consider any distribution F with unique median 0 satisfying R(t) =
QR,F (
1
2 + t) = −QL,F (12 − t) for each t ∈ t¯. Such an F can be constructed by starting with
a Dirac measure δ0 at zero and then pushing mass to the tails as far as (3) allows. Next,
consider the joint distribution on (D,Y,Z) where Y ∼ F , the conditional distribution of
D given Y is Ber(2ε · 1{Y ≤ 0}) and Z ∼ δ
QR,F (
1
2+ε)
. The marginal of D is easily seen to
be correct, since
P(D = 1) = P(D = 1|Y ≤ 0) · P(Y ≤ 0) + P(D = 1|Y > 0) · P(Y > 0) = 2ε · 12 = ε.
Let a :=
√
log(1/δ)
2n , and note that a < ε by our choice of n. For each i ∈ [n], define the
indicator random variable
Li := 1 {(Yi > R(ε− a)) or (Yi ≤ 0 and Di = 1)} .
Each of these has mean
E[Li] ≤ 1− (12 + (ε− a)) + 12 (2ε) = 12 + a.
Therefore, by Hoeffding’s inequality, we conclude that
P
(
|mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn)−m1(F )| < R (ε− a)
)
≤ P
(
mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn) < m1(F ) +R(ε− a)
)
≤ P
(
n∑
i=1
Li ≥ n
2
)
≤ exp (−2a2n) = δ.
B.3 Estimation of Second Robust Moment
Here, we prove Lemma 19. This is done by decomposing the MAD estimation error into
two terms, each of which resembles the error between a true median (of a distribution
related to F ) and an empirical median of contaminated samples, and then applying the
median estimation guarantees from the previous section. We begin by proving several
helpful lemmas.
Lemma 25. For any (possibly random) sequence x1, . . . , xn ∈ R and any c ∈ R,∣∣∣mˆ1(|x1 + c|, . . . , |xn + c|) − mˆ1(|x1|, . . . , |xn|)∣∣∣ ≤ |c|
holds almost surely, over the possible randomness of the sequence.
Proof. For any fixed vector x ∈ Rn, the function c 7→ mˆ1(|x1+c|, . . . , |xn+c|) is 1-Lipschitz
since it is the composition of the following 1-Lipschitz functions with respect to the L∞
norm: adding c~1, taking entrywise absolute values, and taking an order statistic.
We also give the following distributional version of Lemma 25.
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Lemma 26. Consider any real-valued random variable X and any c ∈ R. Assume that
m1(|X|) and m1(|X + c|) are unique. Then∣∣m1(|X + c|)−m1(|X|)∣∣ ≤ |c|.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that c ≥ 0; the case c < 0 follows by an identical
argument or by symmetry. For shorthand, let m := m1(|X|) and let m˜ := m1(|X + c|).
First, we show that m˜ ≤ m + c, i.e., we show that P(|X + c| ≤ m + c) ≥ 12 . This is
straightforward: P(|X + c| ≤ m + c) = P(−m − 2c ≤ X ≤ m) ≥ P(−m ≤ X ≤ m) =
P(|X| ≤ m) ≥ 12 , where we the first step is by non-negativity of m and the last step is by
definition of m. A nearly identical argument shows m ≤ m˜+ c, namely P(|X| ≤ m˜+ c) =
P(−m˜− c ≤ X ≤ m˜+ c) = P(−m˜ ≤ X ≤ m˜+ 2c) ≥ P(−m˜ ≤ X ≤ m˜) = P(|X| ≤ m˜) ≥ 12 .
We therefore conclude that |m˜−m| ≤ c.
Lemma 27. For any distribution F with unique m2(F ) and m4(F ),
m4(F ) ≤ 2m2(F ).
Proof. Let Y ∼ F . By Lemma 26,
m4(F ) = m1
(∣∣ |Y −m1(F )| −m2(F )∣∣) ≤ m1 (|Y −m1(F )|) +m2(F ) = 2m2(F ).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 19.
Proof of Lemma 19. For shorthand, denote mˆ := mˆ1(X1, . . . ,Xn), and let H denote the
distribution of |Y −m1(F )| where Y ∼ F . Combining the fact that m2(F ) = m1(H) with
Lemma 25 and the triangle inequality, the MAD estimation error is bounded above by∣∣∣mˆ2(X1, . . . ,Xn)−m2(F )∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣mˆ1 (|X1 − mˆ|, . . . , |Xn − mˆ|)−m1(H)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣mˆ1 (|X1 −m1(F )|, . . . , |Xn −m1(F )|)−m1(H)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣mˆ−m1(F )∣∣∣. (8)
By Corollary 12 and our choice of n, the second error term in (8) is bounded above by
Uε,B,m2(F )+
E
2 with probability at least 1− δ2 . To control the first error term in (8), we apply
Corollary 12 with the distributionH in lieu of F and the contaminations Z˜i := |Zi−m1(F )|
in lieu of Zi. Thus, by combining item 8 in Lemma 23 with Corollary 12, this first error
term is bounded above by Uε,κB,m2(H)+
E
2 with probability at least 1− δ2 whenever we have
at least 2max
(
4B2κ2m22(H)E
−2, (min(12 ,
1
B )− ε2(1−ε))−2
)
log 4δ samples, which is satisfied
because of our choice of n and the inequality m2(H) = m4(F ) ≤ 2m2(F ) from Lemma 27.
Therefore, a union bound implies that, with probability at least 1−δ, the MAD estimation
error is at most Uε,B,m2(F ) + Uε,κB,m2(H) + E. By another application of the inequality
m2(H) ≤ 2m2(F ), this is bounded above by (1 + 2κ)Uε,B,m2(F ) + E, as desired.
The proof of Lemma 20 – the analogous result to Lemma 19 but for the malicious
adversarial setting – is omitted since it is identical to the proof of Lemma 19 with the uses
of Corollary 12 replaced by uses of Corollary 13.
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C Proofs for Adaptation of the Successive Elimination Al-
gorithm
We first define some notation. Let c be a constant such that nα,δ ≤ cα2 log 1δ for all α > 0
and δ ∈ (0, 1); such a constant clearly exists by definition of PIBAI (see Equation 2).
Let R denote the number of total rounds in Algorithm 2 before termination, and for each
round r ∈ [R], let Sr denote the set of all arms still in S when entering round r. For
succintness, we also denote δr :=
6δ
pi2kr2
.
Proof of Theorem 3. Without loss of generality, assume that the best arm is i∗ = 1. Define
the event E := {|pˆi,r − pi| ≤ Ui + αr,δr , ∀r ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ Sr}. Recall that pˆi,r is the estimate
of the measure of quality for arm i after r samples, and that arm i will stop being pulled
once i /∈ Sr. For analysis purposes, consider consider virtual estimates pˆi,r that would be
obtained if we continued to pull the eliminated arms indefinitely, so that pˆi,r is defined for
all i ∈ [k] and r ∈ N. By a union bound,
P
(
EC
) ≤ k∑
i=1
∞∑
r=1
P (|pˆi,r − pi| > Ui + αr,δr) ≤
k∑
i=1
∞∑
r=1
δr =
k∑
i=1
∞∑
r=1
6δ
π2kr2
= δ,
where above we have used (2) and the famous Basel identity.
We conclude from the above that E occurs with probability at least 1− δ. Henceforth
let us assume that E occurs. A simple induction argument shows that 1 ∈ Sr for each
round r ∈ [R], which implies that Algorithm 2 returns the optimal arm. Indeed, at each
round r for which 1 ∈ Sr, E guarantees that for all j ∈ Sr,
pˆ1,r ≥ p1 − U1 − αr,δr = ∆˜j + pj + Uj − αr,δr > pj + Uj − αr,δr ≥ pˆj,r − 2αr,δr .
and so by definition of Algorithm 2, the optimal arm 1 is not eliminated at round r.
Now, still assuming that E occurs, let us bound the sample complexity T . For each
i ∈ [k], denote by Ti the number of times that arm i is pulled. Clearly, T =
∑k
i=1 Ti.
Moreover, since arm 1 is never eliminated so long as E occurs, T ≤ 2∑ki=2 Ti. For each
i ≥ 2, arm i is eliminated no later than the first round r in which pˆi,r < pˆ1,r−2αr,δr which,
by E, is satisfied as soon as pi +Ui +αr,δr < p1 −U1 − 3αr,δr , or equivalently ∆˜i > 4αr,δr .
We conclude that arm i is eliminated in the first round r where
∆˜i > 4αr,δr = 4
√
c log(pi
2kr2
6δ )
r
,
which occurs for r ≤ C 1
∆˜2i
log
(
k
δ∆˜i
)
for some universal constant C > 0. Hence,
T ≤
k∑
j=2
Tj = O

 k∑
j=2
1
∆˜2i
log
(
k
δ∆˜i
) .
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Proof of Theorem 15. The proof is nearly identical to that of Theorem 3. The main
difference in the proof of correctness is that at each round r ≥ 0, if any arm is still
in Sr, it has been pulled at least
N log
(
π2k
2δ
)
+ 2N
r∑
t=1
log
(
t+ 1
t
)
+ r = N log
(
π2k(r + 1)2
2δ
)
+ r
≥
(
2B2m¯22
α2r,δr
+N
)
log
3
δr
≥ max
(
2B2m¯22
α2r,δr
, N
)
log
3
δr
times. Thus, we may apply Corollary 12 (for oblivious or prescient adversaries) or Corol-
lary 13 (for malicious adversaries) to obtain the identical guarantees as needed in the proof
of Theorem 3 for estimating the median up to accuracy αr,δr with probability at least 1−δr.
Hence, the (0, δ)-PAC guarantee follows easily by identical reasoning. The only difference
in the sample complexity proof is that it we must keep track of the additional draws
k∑
i=1
[⌈
N log
(
π2k
2δ
)⌉
+
Ti∑
t=1
⌈
2N log
(
t+ 1
t
)⌉]
≤
k∑
i=1
[
(Ti + 1) +N log
(
π2k(Ti + 1)
2
2δ
)]
,
where Ti is the number of times that arms i is pulled. By what was shown in Theorem 3, the
first term
∑k
i=1(Ti+1) = O(
∑
i 6=i∗
1
∆˜2i
log( k
δ∆˜i
)), and the second term
∑k
i=1N log(
pi2k(Ti+1)2
2δ ) =
O(N
∑
i 6=i∗ log(
k
δ∆˜i
log( k
δ∆˜i
))) = O(N
∑
i 6=i∗ log(
k
δ∆˜i
)).
D Proofs for Lower Bounds
In this section, we make the proof sketch in Subsection 4.3 formal. The proof is broken into
two parts. First, we exhibit hard instances for BAI in which the arms all have smoothed
Bernoulli distributions. Second, we reduce this instance into a lower bound instance for
CBAI.
Throughout, we adopt the standard assumption in the multi-armed bandit literature
[Mannor and Tsitsiklis, 2004] that all algorithms we consider have a stopping time T which
is almost surely finite.
D.1 BAI Lower Bound
Here, we prove a gap-dependent lower bound for the BAI problem that we will make
use of in the following subsection. Mannor and Tsitsiklis [2004] gave the first such lower
bound by exhibiting hard instances for BAI using Bernoulli-distributed arms. However,
our CBAI reduction will not work with Bernoulli distributions (see the proof sketch in
Subsection 4.3), and so here we exhibit hard instances for BAI using instead a distribution
that will work for our CBAI reduction, namely the smoothed Bernoulli distribution.
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Recall that we define the smoothed Bernoulli distribution with parameter p ∈ (0, 1),
denoted by SBer(p), to be the uniform mixture of the Bernoulli distribution with parameter
p and the uniform distribution on [0, 1] with weights 12 and
1
2 . It is easy to see that for
p, q ∈ (0, 1), the Kullback-Leibler divergence between SBer(p) and SBer(q) is given by
KL(SBer(p),SBer(q)) =
1
2
KL(Ber(p),Ber(q))
=
1
2
(
p log
(
p
q
)
+ (1− p) log
(
1− p
1− q
))
.
In particular, a second-order Taylor expansion yields that, for all η ∈ (0, 12), there exists
some positive constant Cη such that the inequality
KL(SBer(p),SBer(q)) ≤ Cη(p− q)2 (9)
holds for all p, q ∈ [η, 1 − η].
With (9) in hand, the following lemma becomes a direct consequence of Lemma 1 and
Remark 5 from Kaufmann et al. [2016].
Lemma 28. Let k ≥ 2, η ∈ (0, 12), and p1, . . . , pk ∈ [η, 1 − η]. Consider the instance
of BAI where arm i ∈ [k] has distribution SBer(pi). Then, for any α > 0 and any
δ ∈ (0, 320), any (α, δ)-PAC BAI algorithm must use at least the following number of
samples in expectation:
E[T ] ≥ Cη
4

 ∑
i∈[k]\{i∗}
1
max(∆i, α)2
log
(
1
2.4δ
) ,
where i∗ := argmaxi∈[k] pi, and ∆i := pi∗ − pi for each i ∈ [k] \ {i∗}.
D.2 CBAI Lower Bound
In this subsection, we show how to prove the lower bounds for CBAI using the technique
sketched in Subsection 4.3. In particular, we will show how to prove Theorem 16 by
“CBAI-lifting” the MAB instances we proved were hard in Lemma 28. The proof of
Corollary 17 then follows immediately by letting α → 0; since an algorithm that returns
the best arm with probability at least 1− δ, is by definition a (0, δ)-PAC algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 16. Fix any k ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 320 ), α ∈ (0, 16), ε ∈ (0, 115), and t¯ ∈ (0, 110 ).
With η = 13 , Lemma 28 proves that for any p1, . . . , pk ∈ [13 , 23 ], the BAI instance with
F˜i := SBer(pi) distributed-arms has the property that any (α, δ)-PAC BAI algorithm
must use at least
Ω

 ∑
i∈[k]\{i∗}
1
max(∆i, α)2
log 1δ

 (10)
samples in expectation, where i∗ := argmaxi∈[k] pi and {∆i}i∈[k]\{i∗} are the gaps w.r.t.
the arm distributions {SBer(pi)}i∈[k]. Without loss of generality, let us assume 1 =
argmaxi∈[k] pi (arm 1 is the best). At this point we now treat the different adversarial
settings separately, since the lower bounds and thus also the liftings differ.
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D.2.1 Lifting for Oblivious and Prescient Adversaries
Define the following distributions:
F1 : =
1− 2ε
2(1 − ε)Ber(r) +
1
2(1− ε)Unif([0, 1]), and
Fi : =
1− 2ε
2(1 − ε)Ber(qi) +
1
2(1 − ε)Unif([0, 1]) ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , k},
where r := p11−2ε and qi :=
pi−2ε
1−2ε . It is not hard to see that
F˜1 := SBer(p1) = (1− ε)F1 + εδ0, and
F˜i := SBer(pi) = (1− ε)Fi + εδ1 ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
In other words, samples generated from SBer(pi) are equal in distribution to samples
generated from the above contaminated mixture model of (1 − ε)Fi and ε times a Dirac
measure.
Next, a simple calculation shows that m1(F˜1) = p1, m1(F1) = p1 + ε, and m2(F1) =
1−ε
2 . Similarly, for any i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, we have m1(F˜i) = pi, m1(Fi) = pi − ε, and
m2(Fi) =
1−ε
2 . Moreover, for all i ∈ [k], we have that Fi ∈ FB,t¯ for B = 4 and any
t¯ < 12(1−ε) min(pi + ε, 1 − (pi + ε)) ≤ 12 · 1514 ·min(13 , 1 − (23 + 115)) = 17 . We conclude that
for each i ∈ [k], the change in median between the distribution Fi and the contaminated
distribution F˜i is equal to
|m1(F˜i)−m1(Fi)| = ε = Bm2(Fi) ε
2(1 − ε) = Uε,B,m2(Fi).
Therefore, we conclude that running any (α, δ)-approximate CBAI algorithm A on the
samples obtained from the above BAI instance will result in A returning arm Iˆ satisfying
m1(Fi) ≥ m1(F1)− (2Uε,B,1−ε2
+ α) with probability at least 1 − δ. Whenever this event
occurs, we have by the above calculations that piˆ ≥ p1 − α. Therefore, A returned an α
approximate arm with probability at least 1− δ for this hard BAI instance. We conclude
from the lower bound in (10) that A must use at least Ω
(∑
i∈[k]\{i∗}
1
max(∆˜i,α)2
log 1δ
)
sam-
ples in expectation, where {∆˜i}i∈[k]\{i∗} are the effective gaps w.r.t. the arm distributions
{Fi}i∈[k].
D.2.2 Lifting for Malicious Adversaries
The idea is similar to the oblivious and prescient case done above. The difference is
that malicious adversaries can shift quantiles further (see Corollary 13) and so we must
exhibit a lifting that exactly matches this larger shift. Consider the distributions over the
CBAI arms
F1 : =
1
2Ber(p1 + 2ε) +
1
2Unif([0, 1]), and
Fi : =
1
2Ber(pi − 2ε) + 12Unif([0, 1]) ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
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We now present the malicious CBAI adversarial strategy. For the optimal arm 1, define
the joint distribution J1 over (Y1, Z1,D1) where Y1 ∼ F1, Z1 ∼ δ0, and the conditional
distribution of D1 given Y1 is Ber(ε(
p1
2 + ε)
−1
1{Y1 = 1}). Similarly, for each suboptimal
arm i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, define the joint distribution Ji over (Yi, Zi,Di) to be Yi ∼ Fi and
Zi ∼ δ1, and the conditional distribution of Di given Yi is Ber(ε(1−p12 +ε)−11{Yi = 0}). It
is simple to see that for each arm i ∈ [k], the marginals are correct under each Ji. Indeed,
a simple conditioning calculation yields
P(D1 = 1) = P(D1 = 1|Y1 = 1)P(Y1 = 1) + P(D1 = 1|Y1 6= 1)P(Y1 6= 1)
= ε(p12 + ε)
−1 · 12(p1 + 2ε) + 0
= ε.
An identical argument shows that the marginal distribution of Di is also equal to Ber(ε)
for each suboptimal arm i ∈ {2, . . . , k}. Now, for each arm i ∈ [k], denote by Ci the
corresponding contaminated distributions induced by (1−Di)Yi+DiZi where (Yi, Zi,Di) ∼
Ji. It is not hard to see that
F˜1 := SBer(p1) = C1, and
F˜i := SBer(pi) = Ci, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , k}
In other words, samples generated from SBer(pi) are equal in distribution to the samples
generated by the malicious CBAI adversary’s distribution Ci.
A simple calculation shows that for the optimal arm, (F1)
−1(12 ) = p1+2ε and (F˜1)
−1(12) =
(F1)
−1(12 − ε) = p1. Note further that F1 has cdf satisfying F1(s) = 12 (1 − p1 − 2ε) + 12s
for all s ∈ [0, 1), and that F1(1) = 1. Thus, for any x1, x2 ∈ [QL,F1(12 − t¯), QR,F1(12 + t¯)],
we have that |F (x1) − F (x2)| = 12 |x1 − x2| since [12±t¯] ⊆ [0.4, 0.6] is contained within
the interval [12(p1 + 2ε), 1 − 12(p1 + 2ε)] ⊇ [12 (23 + 2 · 115 ), 1 − 12 (23 + 2 · 115)] = [0.4, 0.6].
By definition, this implies that F1 ∈ Ft¯,B1 with B1m2(F1) = 2. (Note that B1 is a
finite constant since p1 ∈ (13 , 23) ⊂ (0, 1) implies m2(Fi) > 0.) A completely identical
calculation shows that each suboptimal arm i ∈ {2, . . . , k} satisfies (Fi)−1(12) = pi − 2ε,
(F˜i)
−1(12 ) = (Fi)
−1(12+ε) = pi, and Fi ∈ Ft¯,Bi with Bim2(Fi) = 2. Therefore, we conclude
that for each i inf[k], the difference in medians between the distributions Fi and F˜i is equal
to
|m1(Fi)−m1(F˜i)| = 2ε = Bim2(Fi)ε = U (malicious)ε,Bi,m2(Fi) ,
which is exactly equal to the largest possible uncertainty.An identical reduction argument
as in the oblivious and prescient adversary finishes the proof.
40
